







Targeted Transfers in Poor Countries:  Revisiting the Trade-Offs 













Social Protection Unit 
Human Development Network 




Social Protection Discussion  Papers are not formal publications of the World Bank. They present preliminary and 
unpolished results of analysis that are circulated to encourage discussion and comment; citation and the use of such a 
paper should take account of its provisional character. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this 
paper are entirely those of the author(s) and should not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, to its affiliated 
organizations or to members of its Board of Executive Directors or the countries they represent.  
 
For free copies of this paper, please contact the Social Protection Advisory Service, The World Bank, 1818 H Street, 
N.W., MSN G8-802, Washington, D.C. 20433 USA. Telephone: (202) 458-5267, Fax: (202) 614-0471, E-mail: 
















































































































dSocial Safety Net Primer Series 
Targeted Transfers in Poor Countries:  





   
 
 
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the 
author(s) and should not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, to its affiliated 
organizations or to members of its Board of Executive Directors or the countries they represent. 
 Social Safety Net Primer Series 
The World Bank Social Safety Nets Primer is intended to provide a practical resource for those engaged in the 
design and implementation of safety net programs around the world. Readers will find information on good practices 
for a variety of types of interventions, country contexts, themes and target groups, as well as current thinking of 
specialists and practitioners on the role of social safety nets in the broader development agenda. Primer papers are 
designed to reflect a high standard of quality as well as a degree of consensus among the World Bank safety nets 
team and general practitioners on good practice and policy. Primer topics are initially reviewed by a steering 
committee composed of both World Bank and outside specialists, and draft papers are subject to peer review for 
quality control. Y et the format of the series is flexible enough to reflect important developments in the field in a 
timely fashion.  
The primer series contributes to the teaching materials covered in the annual Social Safety Nets course offered 
in Washington DC as well as various other Bank-sponsored courses. The Social Safety Nets Primer and the annual 
course are jointly supported by the Social Protection unit of the Human Development Network and by the World 
Bank Institute. The World Bank Institute also offers customized regional courses through Distance Learning on a 
regular basis. 
For more information on the primer paper series and papers on other safety nets topics, please contact the 
Social Protection Advisory Service; telephone (202) 458-5267; fax (202) 614-0471; email: 
socialprotection@worldbank.org. Copies of related safety nets papers, including the Social Safety Nets Primer 
series, are available in electronic form at www.worldbank.org/safetynets. The website also contains translated 
versions of the papers as they become available. An ambitious translation plan is underway (especially for Spanish 
and French, some in Russian). For more information about WBI courses on social safety nets, please visit the 
website www.worldbank.org/wbi/socialsafetynets.  
Recent and Forthcoming Papers in the Safety Nets Primer as of August 2002
1 
Theme  Author 
Program Interventions   
Cash transfers  Tabor 
Food related programs  Rogers and Coates 
Price and tax subsidies  Alderman 
Fee waivers in health   Bitran and Giedion 
Fee waivers in housing   Katsura and Romanik 
Public works  Subbarao 
Micro credit and informal insurance  Sharma and Morduch 
Cross-cutting Issues   
Overview  Grosh, Blomquist and Ouerghi 
Institutions  de Neubourg 
Targeting  Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott 
Evaluation  Blomquist 
Political Economy  Graham 
Gender  Ezemenari, Chaudhury and Owens 
Community Based Targeting  Conning and Kevane 
Country Setting/Target Group   
Very Low Income Countries  Smith and Subbarao 
Transition Economies  Fox 
Non-contributory pensions  Grosh and Schwarz 
1. Papers may be added or deleted from the series from time to time. 
 Abstract 
The conventional wisdom in mainstream development policy circles is that income transfers to 
the poor, and safety net policies more generally, are at best a short-term palliative and at worst a 
waste of money.  They are not seen as a core element of an effective long-term poverty reduction 
strategy.  These views are starting to be questioned.  Firstly, evidence from careful evaluations 
has pointed to a number of success stories.  Secondly, the presumption of an overall trade-off 
between redistribution or insurance and growth has come to be questioned. 
This paper revisits the role of targeted transfers in poor countries  in light of the new 
theories on the social costs of uninsured risks and unmitigated inequalities. This body of theory 
and evidence offers a new perspective on social protection policies in poor countries, suggesting 
that there is scope for using these policies to compensate for the market failures that help 
perpetuate poverty, particularly in high-inequality settings. While acknowledging caveats to 
policy implementation, the paper suggests that it is time for a pragmatic and open-minded 
approach to this class of interventions, recognizing the potentially important role they can play, 
but using careful design and evaluation to assure that the potential is realized. Table of Contents 
I. Introduction...............................................................................................................................1 
 
II. Revisiting the Equity-Efficiency Tradeoff.............................................................................2 
 
III. Revisiting the Insurance-Efficiency Tradeoff......................................................................6 
 
IV. Efficient Redistribution Through Targeted Transfers .......................................................9 
 
V. Conclusions .............................................................................................................................16 
  
  1 
Targeted Transfers in Poor Countries: 
Revisiting the Trade-Offs and Policy Options 
 
Martin Ravallion  
Research Manager, Development Research Group, World Bank
1 
 
I. Introduction  
The conventional wisdom in mainstream development policy circles is that income transfers to 
the poor, and safety net policies more generally, are at best a short-term palliative and at worst a 
waste of money.  They are not seen as a core element of an effective long-term poverty reduction 
strategy.   
What is this conventional wisdom based on?  One commonly heard view is that the poor are 
roughly equally poor in the poorest countries, and there are so many of them and resources are so 
limited, that these policies are a non-starter.  However, while the extent of poverty and the 
resource limitations are both clear enough, the other premise is not; it is now well established 
from household survey data that even in the poorest countries, the differences in levels of living 
amongst the poor can be sizable.
2 
Another long-standing critique of this class of policies has potentially more weight.  This 
says that leakage of benefits to non-target groups and adverse incentive effects on the labor 
supply and savings of transfer recipients create a serious trade off against efficiency and growth, 
which is seen to be crucial to rapid poverty reduction. Even broadly supportive assessments of 
this class of policy interventions have seen their redistributive role as solely a matter of equity.
3   
Similarly, it is often argued that the incentive effects of public efforts to provide better insurance 
can entail a cost to growth and, hence, longer-term poverty reduction. 
                                                 
1   For helpful comments I am grateful to Nancy Birdsall, Alain de Janvry, Quy-Toan Do, Francisco 
Ferreira, Emanuela Galasso, Robert Holzmann, Alice Mesnard, Rinku Murgai, Berk Özler, Elisabeth 
Sadoulet and Dominique van de Walle. The support of the World Bank’s Social Protection Board is 
gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed here should not be attributed to the World Bank.   
2   For example, Smith and Subbarao (2002) give data for low-income countries indicating that the 
consumption of the poorest decile is generally 30-40% lower than the next poorest.   
3   For example, Barr (1992) describes the “inequality reduction” role of these policies as “almost 
entirely an equity issue” (p.746).    2 
These views are starting to be questioned at two levels.  Firstly, evidence from careful 
evaluations has pointed to a number of success stories.  Yes, there are programs that claim to be 
targeted to the poor but whose benefits are captured by others, and there are programs that 
concentrate their benefits on poor people but have such low coverage that they achieve little 
impact overall.  However, assessments of a number of programs have been quite positive — 
debunking claims that targeted programs in poor countries are inevitably plagued by leakage and 
high administrative costs.
4 Limited redistribution appears to be possible by this means.   
Secondly, the presumption of an overall trade-off between redistribution or insurance (on 
the one hand) and growth (on the other) has come to be questioned. It is known that a market 
economy can generate too much risk and inequality, judged solely from the viewpoint of 
aggregate output.
5  This theoretical possibility has given a new lease of life to targeted transfers 
as the main instruments for publicly-provided “social protection” in poor countries, which is seen 
as being good for pro-poor growth (meaning growth that reduces poverty) by providing 
insurance or helping credit-constrained poor people be productive workers or take up productive 
opportunities for self-employment.
6    
    This paper revisits the role of targeted transfers in poor countries in the light of the new 
theories on the social costs of uninsured risks and unmitigated inequalities.  Recognizing that the 
policy implications depend crucially on whether there is good empirical evidence to support the 
theoretical arguments, the bulk of the first half of the paper discusses the evidence. The paper 
then takes up a key question for policy: Can the potential for efficient redistribution be realized 
in practice using targeted transfers, given the constraints faced in poor countries?   
 
II. Revisiting the Equity-Efficiency Tradeoff  
The presumption that there is an aggregate trade off between the twin goals of economic growth 
and lower inequality can be questioned for a number of reasons including the following:   
•  Unless a person can initially assure that her basal metabolic rate (BMR) — the food 
energy intake needed to support bodily functions at rest — is reached there can be 
no productive activity of any sort.  This “threshold effect” can  mean that an 
economy generates massive involuntary unemployment under one distribution of 
                                                 
4   Compilations of evidence on targeting performance can be found in Grosh (1995) and Coady et 
al., (2002). The latter paper compiles evidence on the targeting performance of about 90 programs; for 
over half, the share of program benefits going to the “poor” exceeded their population share. Of course, 
the quality of the data and methods varies considerably; the hope is that the differences average to zero. 
5   A number of excellent surveys are now available of this literature, notably Aghion et al., (1999), 
Bardhan et al., (2000), Broadway and Keen (2000) and Kanbur (2000).  Specific papers that have fueled 
this questioning of the aggregate equity-efficiency trade-off include Dasgupta and Ray (1986), Dasgupta 
(1993), Galor and Zeira (1993), Bowles and Gintis (1996), Bénabou (1996, 2002), McGregor (1995), 
Hoff and Lyon (1995), Hoff (1996), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Aghion et al. (1999), Piketty (1997) and 
Bardhan et al. (2000).   
 
6   Policy-oriented discussions can be found in Holzmann and Jorgensen (1999), Bourguignon 
(2000), World Bank (2000, 2001) and Smith and Subbarao (2002) amongst others.    3 
assets, while a more equitable distribution yields full employment and high output 
(Dasgupta and Ray, 1986).  The more equal distribution will mean that more people 
can reach the minimum nutritional requirement for work, and so aggregate output 
will be higher.  
•  Credit market failures mean that some people are unable t o exploit growth-
promoting opportunities for investment in (physical and human) capital. Aggregate 
output is the sum of the individual outputs, each depending on own capital, in turn 
determined by own wealth given the market failure. Then aggregate output will 
depends on the distribution of wealth (Galor and Zeira, 1993;  Bénabou, 1996; 
Aghion and Bolton, 1997, amongst others). With declining marginal products of 
capital, the output loss from the market failure will be greater for the poor.  So the 
higher the proportion of poor people the lower aggregate output.   
•  Distribution-dependent growth can also be generated by the political economy, 
notably the way initial distribution influences the balance of power over public 
spending (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994).  
•  Market failures can also create a link between spatial inequalities and growth. 
Geographic externalities entail that living in a well-endowed area means that a poor 
household can eventually escape poverty, while an otherwise identical household 
living in a poor area sees stagnation or decline (Jalan and Ravallion, 2002a).  For 
this to be sustained, there must be impediments to factor mobility, such that 
marginal products of capital and labor come to depend causally on location.  Then 
policies to redress spatial inequalities can compensate for the underlying factor 
market failures and so stimulate pro-poor growth.
7       
These arguments are fine in theory, but what does the evidence suggest?   Compilations of 
aggregate data on growth and distribution suggest that countries with higher initial inequality 
tend to experience lower rates of growth controlling for other factors including initial income, 
openness to trade and the rate of inflation.
8  Indeed, if inequality is sufficiently high, countries 
that would have good growth prospects at low inequality may well realize little or no overall 
growth or progress in reducing poverty.  It is estimated that about one fifth of the date-country 
combinations in a data set for developing countries were cases in which inequality was so high as 
to stifle pro-poor growth (Ravallion, 1997b).     
There are a number of concerns about the data and methods used in testing for an aggregate 
equity-efficiency trade off, and the biases can go either way. There are measurement errors in 
both the levels and changes in measured income inequality, including comparability problems 
between countries and over time arising from errors in survey data (both sampling and non-
                                                 
7   This can be thought of as an example of a more general class of models in which memberships 
influence socioeconomic outcomes (Durlauf, 2001). 
8   Papers reporting this result include Persson and Tabellini (1994), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), 
Birdsall et al., (1995), Birdsall and Londono (1997), Clarke (1995), Perotti (1996), Deininger and Squire 
(1998), Deininger and Olinto (2000) and Knowles (2001). 
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sampling errors) and h eterogeneity in survey design and processing.
9 There are also concerns 
about latent effects in the growth process that might be correlated with initial inequality. The 
latter concern can be dealt with by allowing for country-specific effects, and then the adverse 
impact of inequality on growth has not been robust (Li and Zou, 1998; Barro, 2000; Forbes, 
2000). However the signal-to-noise ratio could well be quite low in fixed-effects regressions of 
growth on inequality and sizable bias is possible.   
Another concern is that spurious inequality effects can arise from aggregation, given credit 
market failures.
10 Empirical results for rural China in Ravallion (1998) indicate that regional 
aggregation across the underlying micro-growth process hides the adverse effect of inequality on 
growth.  
The choice of control variables in identifying the relationship is also open to question. For 
example, past tests of the effect of inequality on growth have controlled for the human capital 
stock, yet reducing investment in human capital is presumably one of the ways that inequality 
matters to growth.  
The validity of the common assumption that initial inequality has a linear effect on 
aggregate growth is also questionable: Banerjee and Duflo (1999) find evidence that changes in 
income inequality are bad for growth, whichever way the changes go.  Then policies that prevent 
rising inequality are good for growth, but those that reduce current inequality are not.   
Given the concerns about tests using country-level data, it is promising that these theories 
also have some testable implications for micro data.  The following are examples:  
•  Farm yields (output per acre) in poor countries tend to be lower the larger the 
landholding; Binswanger et al (1995) review the evidence on this n egative 
correlation, and discuss alternative explanations.  To some extent the negative 
correlation reflects unobserved heterogeneity in land quality. However, there is a 
reasonable presumption and some evidence suggesting that the negative correlation 
stems from factor market failures due to asymmetric information. Then inequality-
reducing redistributions from large landholders to smallholders will raise aggregate 
output.       
•  Theoretical models based on credit-market failures predict that individual income or 
wealth at one date will be an increasing concave function of its own past value. This 
is testable on micro panel data.  Using such data, Lokshin and Ravallion (2001) 
found nonlinearity in household income dynamics for Hungary and Russia and Jalan 
and Ravallion (2001) found the same thing in panel data for rural China.
11 In all 
                                                 
9   For further discussion of the data problems see Bourguignon (2000) and Kanbur (2000).  
10   For example, consistent aggregation across micro units can require that we use the mean of log 
incomes in the aggregate growth regression. However, our data are logs of means. The difference between 
the two is a measure of inequality, which can be significant purely because of inconsistent aggregation.   
11   The dynamic panel data models in these studies were estimated by methods that allowed for the 
endogeneity of lagged income, latent individual effects and endogenous attrition.  
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three countries, the type of nonlinearity suggests that the growth rate of mean 
household income will be lower the higher the initial inequality. Depending on the 
model specification, the results for rural China imply that inequality in current 
incomes lowers the mean in the following year by 4-7% at given current mean 
income (Jalan and Ravallion, 2001). (This is based on a simulation in which all 
incomes are replaced by the mean; naturally this is an upper bound that is unlikely to 
be attainable in practice.)  These figures are lower than those obtained by Lokshin 
and Ravallion for Russia and Hungary, where inequality appears to be more costly 
to growth; inequality accounts for one fifth of mean current income in Hungary and 
about one tenth in Russia. 
•  Some of the theories based on credit market failures also predict that the adverse 
impact of higher inequality on growth will be transmitted though the occupational 
structure of an economy (Banerjee and Newman, 1993).  In testing this link, 
Mesnard and Ravallion (2002) find evidence that wealth inequality attenuates the 
aggregate level of business start-ups amongst return migrants in Tunisia.    
•  There is empirical support for another link between inequality and growth, via the 
incidence of undernutriton.  This is likely to lower aggregate productivity.  For 
example, it has been found that undernourished farm workers in poor countries tend 
to be less productive (Strauss, 1986;  Deolalikar, 1988).  Also, malnutrition in 
children is thought to have adverse long-term consequences for their learning and 
hence future incomes; supportive evidence can be found in Bhargava (1999) (for 
Kenya), Glewwe et al. (2001) (for the Philippines) and Alderman et al. (2002) 
(Zimbabwe); in the latter case, the authors directly link the poor nutritional status of 
children to a drought. Higher income inequality is also likely to raise the incidence 
of undernutrition; Dasgupta and Ray (1986) show how this can happen in theory and 
there is supportive evidence in Ravallion (1992), using micro data for Indonesia.   
•  Yet another link that has been studied empirically is through crime. Bourguignon 
(2001) discusses the theory and evidence suggesting that higher poverty and 
inequality can promote crime, which is surely costly to aggregate efficiency.  Using 
micro data, Demombynes and Özler (2002) find evidence for South Africa that 
greater consumption inequality within and between neighborhoods leads to higher 
crime rates. 
•  There is also supportive evidence from micro data on the costs of spatial 
inequalities.  The methods often used in empirical work on this topic cannot 
distinguish externalities from other factors far more benign from a policy point of 
view; possibly all one is picking up is that households who are poor in terms of 
some latent characteristic tend to be grouped together spatially and are less able to 
attract geographically assigned resources.  Jalan and Ravallion (2002a) offer a test 
that is robust to latent heterogeneity.  This involves regressing consumption growth 
at the household level on geographic variables, allowing for nonstationary individual 
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effects in the growth rates.  On implementing the test on a six-year panel of farm-
household data for rural southern China in the 1980s, they find that indicators of 
geographic capital had divergent impacts on consumption growth at the micro level, 
controlling for (observed and unobserved) household characteristics.  Living in a 
poor area appears to lower the productivity of a farm-household’s own investments, 
which reduces the growth rate, given restrictions on capital mobility.  The results 
suggest that there are areas in rural China that are so poor that the consumptions of 
some households living in them were falling even while otherwise identical 
households living in better off areas enjoyed rising consumptions. The geographic 
effects are strong enough to imply poverty traps.   
•  One specific source of externalities is the local composition of economic activity.  In 
the same setting in rural China, there is evidence that the composition of local 
economic activity has non-negligible impacts on consumption growth at the farm-
household level (Ravallion, 2002). There are significant positive effects of local 
economic activity in a given sector on subsequent income growth from that sector. 
And there are a number of significant cross-effects, notably from farming to certain 
nonfarm activities. The sector that is found to matter most quantitatively is 
agriculture.   
•  There i s recent micro evidence pointing to the importance of other membership-
based inequalities.  For example, van de Walle and Gunewardena (2001) argue that 
market failures entail that ethnic identity influences living standards in Vietnam 
independently of observable household characteristics, and in ways that are 
suggestive of a self-reinforcing mechanism that perpetuates ethnic inequalities.  
Again, market failures play a crucial role. 
Before turning to the implications of all this for targeted transfers, another strand of recent 
literature needs to be brought into the picture.  This concerns the possibility that uninsured risk 
can also be a negative factor to growth and poverty reduction in the longer term.   
III. Revisiting the Insurance-Efficiency Tradeoff  
By one view, publicly provided insurance encourages longer-term behaviors that promote 
continuing poverty.  The classic example is a generous unemployment benefit system, which is 
thought by some observers to discourage personal efforts to find work.  Similarly, public 
provision of old-age pensions is thought to discourage savings.  These are examples of how 
moral hazard generates an insurance-efficiency trade-off. 
Are there also reasons to question the insurance-efficiency trade-off in poor countries?  
From what we know, it is difficult to argue that poor people in the world are typically over-
insured from the point of view of making them less poor.  There is now a body of empirical work 
demonstrating a high exposure to uninsured risk, notably in rural areas.
12  It is widely thought, 
and plausible on a priori grounds, that the poor tend to be more risk averse (in the sense of 
                                                 
12   Overviews of the theory and evidence can be found in Deaton (1992) and Besley (1995). 
   7 
having a higher Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion) and there is some supportive 
evidence from the work of Binswanger (1981) using experimental data for rural India.  And it is 
often claimed that the poor are more vulnerable to uninsured risk; this is less obvious, though 
there is some supportive evidence in the results of Jalan and Ravallion (1999) on the sensitivity 
of consumption to income shocks in rural China.  These observations suggest that there may well 
be scope for public efforts to better provide insurance to the poor, and targeted transfers are a 
likely instrument.  However, will this come at a longer-term cost to poor people?   
Recent literature has also pointed to various ways that uninsured risk can actually be a cause 
of chronic poverty.  One argument postulates threshold effects in consumption giving rise to a 
“dynamic poverty trap.”  To outline a simple case, consider a worker who cannot borrow or save 
and derives income solely from labor.  The worker’s productivity depends on past consumption, 
and only if consumption is above some critical level is it possible to be productive and hence 
earn any income.  Beyond this threshold, diminishing returns set it, meaning that extra current 
consumption raises future productivity but at a declining rate as consumption rises.   
In this type of model, permanent destitution can stem from transient shocks and people can 
escape even extreme poverty with only temporary income support.  These features arise from the 
possibility of multiple solutions for the income or wealth of a given family.  There can be a high-
income solution and a low income one, both of which are dynamically stable, in that income will 
return to its initial value after a shock.  Between these, one can expect to find an unstable third 
solution, below which incomes tend to fall toward the low-income solution, while above which 
they rise to the high-income solution. Thus, a household at the high-income solution who suffers 
a sufficiently large negative shock will see its income decline until it reaches the lowest income. 
And a household at the low-income solution will be able to escape poverty after even a transient 
income gain — but only if that gain is large enough to get past the unstable solution.  This is an 
example of a “dynamic poverty trap.”  It implies that there will be large long-term benefits from 
institutions and policies that protect people from transient shocks, or provide temporary support 
for the poorest.  Likewise, the absence of an effective safety net emerges as a cause of long-term 
poverty.   
Are such arguments plausible?  The very existence of a positive BMR means that a 
consumption threshold must exist, which is one requirement for the dynamic poverty trap 
described above whereby uninsured risk can create longer-term poverty.  Unless a person can 
initially assure that BMR is reached there can be no productive activity of any sort.  A threshold 
effect can also stem from the fact that in almost all societies one must be housed and adequately 
clothed if one is to participate in most social activity, including work.  Low consumption creates 
social exclusion.  For example, advocates of a proposed (untargeted) transfer program in South 
Africa claimed that the grant would be productive, by allowing people to travel to find work and 
to buy clothes to wear to job interviews (Washington Post Foreign Service, July 9, 2002).   
However, the case for intervention rests on believing that the threshold effect exists in the 
absence of intervention. That is less clear. There will be a high return to private co-insurance 
when there is a threshold effect. One can readily grant that (market or quasi-market) credit and 
risk-sharing arrangements do not work perfectly, given the usual problems of asymmetric 
information.  Yet they may still work well enough to make dynamic poverty traps a rarity.     8 
The panel-data studies by Lokshin and Ravallion (2001) and Jalan and Ravallion (2001a) 
discussed above also tested for the existence of dynamic poverty traps.  Household income or 
consumption was allowed to be a nonlinear function of its own lagged value with corrections for 
latent heterogeneity and measurement errors.  On calibrating the model to a six-year household-
level panel data (in which the same households are tracked over time) for rural southwest China, 
Jalan and Ravallion (2001a) did not find evidence of threshold effects in the dynamics (though 
they do find nonlinearity, as discussed above).
13 The same is true of Lokshin and Ravallion 
(2001), using data for Russia and Hungary.  The results for all three countries suggest that people 
tend to bounce back from transient shocks.  However, all three studies found that the speed of 
income adjustment to a shock is lower for the poor (those with low steady-state income).
14 This 
can generate a process of income dynamics that might look like a poverty trap but is not.   
If one takes it as given that without a (formal or informal) safety net there will be a low-
level threshold effect on productivity, then these results suggest the existence of a roughly 
binding consumption floor achieved by existing (public and private) safety nets.  Of course, that 
can still leave considerable uninsured risk, which is found to be the case in the same settings.
15  
And the dynamics might be quite different for highly covariate risk, since the informal safety net 
arrangements may then break down, leaving the threshold exposed.  
Uninsured risk can also perpetuate poverty via production and portfolio choices. A number 
of empirical studies have found costly behavioral responses to  income risk in poor rural 
economies.
16  Outmoded agricultural technologies can persist because they are less risky (see, for 
example, Morduch, 1995). R isk can induce poor credit-constrained households to hold high 
levels of relatively unproductive liquid wealth.  If borrowing is not an option when there is a 
sudden drop in income, then liquid wealth will be needed to protect consumption.  For example, 
Indian farmers have been found to hold livestock as a precaution against risk even though more 
productive investment opportunities were available (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993).  
Whether it is the poor who incur the largest costs of uninsured risk is not as obvious as is 
often claimed by casual observers. Jalan and Ravallion (2001b) tested for portfolio and other 
behavioral responses to idiosyncratic risk in the same rural areas of southwest China.  They 
confirmed other findings that wealth is held in unproductive liquid forms to protect against 
idiosyncratic income risk. However, consistently with expectations from their theoretical model, 
they found that neither the poorest quintile nor the richest appear to hold liquid wealth because of 
                                                 
13   Possibly the threshold effect takes longer than six years, though it is difficult to see why a sign of 
the productivity cost of low initial consumption would not be apparent over this time period.  
14   The steeper the recursion diagram the slower the speed of adjustment to a shock.  Concavity of 
the recursion diagram implies that the speed of adjustment for a given household will be lower when it 
receives a negative shock than a positive shock. However, here we are concerned with differences in the 
speed of adjustment between households at different steady-state incomes. In all three countries, the speed 
of adjustment (evaluated in a neighborhood of the steady-state solution) was found to be lower for 
households with lower steady-state incomes.   
15   See Jalan and Ravallion (1998a) for China and Lokshin and Ravallion (2000) for Russia. 
16   Examples include Paxson (1992), Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993), Rosenzweig and Wolpin 
(1993), Alderman (1996), Dercon (1998) and Fafchamps, Udry and Czukas (1998). 
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income risk; it is the middle-income groups that do so. It appears that the rich in this setting do 
not need to hold precautionary liquid wealth, and the poor cannot afford to do so.   
Other potentially costly responses to risk identified in the literature include adverse effects 
on human capital.  Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) find seasonal effects on schooling of income risk 
in semi-arid areas of India.  But here too the evidence is mixed.  Jalan and Ravallion (2001b) 
find that schooling and (hence) future incomes in their data for rural China are quite well 
protected from the income and health risks faced by the household.  Schady (2002) finds that 
schooling increased during Peru’s macroeconomic crisis 1988-92, which he attributes to lower 
foregone income from attending school during the crisis. 
Some of the evidence suggests large long-term costs to the poor from uninsured risk, but 
some does not.  Of course, there are still welfare costs of uninsured risks facing poor people; the 
classic risk-aversion case for insurance remains even if risk is not a cause of chronic poverty.   
IV. Efficient Redistribution Through Targeted Transfers  
Market imperfections point to a potential for efficient redistributions, which help alleviate the 
constraints arising from those market imperfections.  This has a number of implications for 
policy.  For example, it suggests that the common focus on the direct static incidence of transfers 
— how much goes to the poor versus nonpoor, for example — may miss important dynamic 
benefits from such policies, as argued by Holzmann (1990).   It also holds implications for the 
design of targeted transfers, which this section will consider further. 
Of course, finding that inequality and uninsured risk are more likely to be harmful to growth 
than to be growth promoting does not in itself imply that any policy to reduce inequality or risk 
will enhance growth and reduce poverty in the longer term.  Indeed, the opposite can happen if 
the policy intervention comes at the expense of other factors that are also known to matter to 
growth. Reducing inequality by adding further distortions to external trade or the domestic 
economy will have ambiguous effects. By the same token, the best role for policy may not be to 
reduce current inequality, but rather to attenuate its adverse impacts, such as by alleviating the 
market failures that make inequality matter to aggregate welfare outcomes over time.   
These observations warn for caution in drawing lessons for redistributive policy from the 
existing theory and evidence on the efficiency costs of inequality.  However, as this section will 
argue, this new literature does hold some insights for policy.   
The following discussion will not try to identify the best programs in the abstract, which is 
probably futile; recent evidence on the heterogeneity in the performance of the same program 
across different settings, and the lack of heterogeneity in the performance of different programs 
in the same setting, points to the importance of context and the weak power of generalizations 
about what works and what does not.
17  However, there is more scope for generalizations about 
principles for guiding the design of effective interventions in specific settings.    
                                                 
17   For an example of the heterogeneity in performance of the same program see Galasso and 
Ravallion (2002); for an example of how similar program performance can be in the same setting see 
Pritchett et al (2002).    10 
Objectives and constraints:  Poverty reduction is typically seen to be the objective of 
targeted transfers in poor countries.  “Poverty” is typically defined as the inability to afford 
specific consumption needs in a given society. There is a large literature on how this can be 
measured (for an overview see Ravallion, 1994).  Here I shall only note some key issues that 
arise in the context of discussing targeted transfers. 
Firstly, aggregate poverty is taken to be a population-weighted aggregate of individual 
poverty levels.  Group memberships may still be causally relevant to poverty and figure 
prominently in targeted policies (as discussed below), but only in so far as those groups have 
high concentrations of individual poverty or group memberships influence other constraints on 
policy-making, such as political economy constraints (whereby certain groups have 
disproportionate influence).  Such “individualism” in defining the welfare objectives of policy is 
standard practice though it can be questioned; see for example Kanbur (2000).       
Secondly, while targeting is a potential instrument for enhancing program impact on 
poverty, the most targeted program need not be the one with the greatest impact on poverty (van 
de Walle, 1998).  This can happen when finer targeting undermines political support for the 
required taxation (Besley and Kanbur, 1993; Gelbach and Pritchett, 1997; De Donder and 
Hindriks, 1998), or when targeting generates deadweight losses (Ravallion and Datt, 1995).   
Thirdly, while one might agree that poverty reduction is the objective, there is still an issue 
of how impact on poverty today should be weighed against poverty in the future.  Theories of 
efficient redistribution point to the importance of reaching those who are locked out of credit and 
insurance, leading to under investment in physical and human capital and hence higher future 
poverty.  Theory and policy have often assumed that this is the same set of people as the 
currently “poor” by some agreed definition, but that cannot be presumed to hold in reality. For 
example, while household poverty is correlated with children’s school attendance, there are non-
negligible numbers of poor children at school, and plenty of kids from non-poor families not at 
school.
18  The currently poor need not be the same set of people as those excluded from credit 
and insurance, and so vulnerable to future poverty.     
Finally, it should not be forgotten that the scope for efficient redistribution and insurance is 
constrained by the information available and administrative capabilities for acting on that 
information.  Problems of information and incentives are at the heart of policy design.
19  
Informational constraints are particularly relevant in underdeveloped economies.  In rural sectors 
and the urban informal sector, policies such as a progressive income tax are seldom feasible 
(though of course such policies are themselves second-best responses to information constraints 
even in rich countries). Means tests pose similar problems.  
The following discussion will focus on how the main types of policies found in practice 
deal with these constraints.  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
18   See, for example, the evidence for Mexico in Sadoulet and de Janvry (2002). 
19   Overviews of the arguments and evidence can be found in Besley and Kanbur (1993), Lipton and 
Ravallion (1995, section 6), van de Walle (1998), Kanbur (2000) and Coady et al., (2002). 
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Indicator targeting:  The problems of observing incomes and the incentive effects of means 
testing have led to various schemes that make transfers according to covariates of poverty, such 
as living in a poor area, age (both children and the elderly), and landlessness in rural areas. Tools 
exist for finding optimal allocations to minimize a poverty index based on such poverty proxies 
and for measuring the maximum impact on poverty (Ravallion, 1993).   
Policy makers seem often to have over-optimistic views on how well they can reach the 
poor by administrative targeting based on readily observable indicators.  Here there are some 
sobering lessons from empirical research.  Even using a comprehensive, high-quality, survey one 
can rarely explain more than half the variance in consumption or income across households. And 
while household consumption is probably not a random walk, it is difficult to explain more than 
one tenth of the variance in future changes in consumption using current information in a panel 
survey.
20  Add to this the fact that one must base targeting on observations for the whole 
population — not just a sample survey — and that there will be incentives to distort the data 
when it is known why it is being collected, one must expect potentially large errors in practice 
when using indicator targeting to fight chronic or (especially) transient poverty.     
But it can also be argued that the benefits of indicator targeting are often underestimated.  
Past work has typically viewed indicator targeting as a static non-behavioral problem; for 
example, location is simply one of the proxies used to indicate poverty. The possibility of 
poverty traps arising from market failures offers a different perspective, pointing to the potential 
for dynamic efficiency gains.  Targeting poor areas or minority ethnic groups — that would 
otherwise be locked out of economic opportunities — may well have considerably greater impact 
than suggested by the role of these characteristics as a purely statistical indicator of poverty 
would suggest.   
The evidence to support that claim is still scant and often inconclusive.  Some observers 
have pointed to evidence that a share of the transfers received by the poor is often saved or 
invested as indicating that the transfers reduce chronic poverty.
21 However, this could just as 
well reflect recipients’ perceptions that the transfers are transient; there can be saving from a 
short-term transfer even when it has no impact on long-term income.   
Longitudinal (“panel”) data can offer more convincing evidence, but such studies are still 
scarce.  In one example, household panel data collected over six years was used to study the 
consumption impacts of China’s massive anti-poverty program targeted to poor areas. It was 
found that the program raised long-term consumption growth rates, implying quite reasonable 
rates of return over time (Jalan and Ravallion, 1998). In another example, Garces et al. (2002) 
studied panel data spanning 27 years for the U.S. and found longer-term gains in schooling and 
earnings from a pre-school program targeted to poor families in the U.S.  
Productivity effects have been emphasized in schemes that redistribute between landholding 
classes. Landless households in rural areas tend to have a high incidence of poverty (in South 
                                                 
20   For a direct test of the random walk property (as implied by the permanent income hypothesis 
under certain conditions) see Bhargava and Ravallion (1993), using panel data from rural India. 
21   See, for example, Devereux (2002) using data for transfer programs in Mozambique, Namibia 
and Zambia.   12 
Asia particularly).  Ravallion and Sen (1994) study the effects of redistribution using transfers 
between landholding classes in rural Bangladesh, allowing for the higher productivity (output per 
acre) of smaller holdings. They find that these effects do increase the poverty-reducing impact of 
land-based targeting, though the extra impact is not large, given that land holding is not by any 
means a perfect poverty indicator, even in rural Bangladesh.  
  Specific demographic groups (both children and the elderly) have also been targeted, and 
here too there can be efficiency benefits.
22  For example, South Africa has a pension scheme that 
gives cash transfers to the elderly; Duflo (2000) finds positive external benefits to child health 
within recipient families. 
  Finding that transfers based on indicators of current poverty can bring long-term benefits, 
given factor market imperfections, does not mean that they are the best policy option for this 
purpose.  Policies to increase factor mobility can also have a role.  Incentives to attract  private 
capital into poorly endowed areas, and/or encourage labor migration out of them, could well be 
more poverty reducing than targeted transfers.  There has been very little work on these policy 
choices, and one often hears overstated claims by advocates. For example, it is far from clear that 
that out-migration policies from poor areas are highly substitutable with transfers to those areas, 
which can be crucial to fostering out migration, such as by promoting better schooling or making 
livelihoods less vulnerable to temporary labor shortages.     
Conditional transfers:  In the 1990s, a number of new transfer programs emerged that 
combine indicator targeting, often using community groups, with explicit attempts to enhance 
capital accumulation of the poor.
23  One class of these programs combines transfers with 
schooling (and sometimes health-care) requirements.
24  An example is Bangladesh’s Food-for-
Education (FFE) Program, which relies on community-based targeting of food transfers that aim 
to create an incentive for reducing the cost to the poor of market failures.  FFE was one of the 
earliest of many school-enrollment subsidy programs now found in both developing and 
developed countries.  Other examples are Progresa in Mexico and Bolsa Escola in Brazil; in 
these programs, cash transfers are targeted to  certain demographic groups in poor areas 
conditional on regular school attendance and visits to health centers. 
If one was concerned solely with current income gains to participants then one would 
clearly not want to use school attendance requirements, which impose a cost on poor families by 
inducing them to withdraw children or teenagers from the labor force, thus reducing the (net) 
income gain to the poor.  This type of program is clearly aiming to balance a current poverty 
                                                 
22   Here too measurement problems loom large. Allowing for scale economies in consumption can 
readily reverse the common finding that larger households tend to be poorer based on consumption or 
income per person (Lanjouw and Ravallion, 1995). 
 
23   McGregor (1995) provides an interesting theoretical analysis of the policy choice between a pure 
transfer policy versus schooling plus transfers, suggesting that the latter option is likely to dominate. 
24   The term “conditional transfers” is widely used in recent policy-oriented discussions to refer 
exclusively to  such programs.  However, this is rather odd usage, given that it would seem that all 
transfer programs in practice have eligibility conditions of some sort.  
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reduction objective against an  objective of reducing future poverty.  Given the credit market 
failure, the incentive effect on labor supply of the program (often seen as an adverse outcome of 
transfers) is now judged to be a benefit — to the extent that a well-targeted transfer allows poor 
families to keep the kids in school, rather than sending them to work.   
There is evidence of significant gains from Bangladesh’s FFE program in terms of school 
attendance with only modest forgone income through displaced child labor (Ravallion and 
Wodon, 2000).  The program was able to appreciably increase schooling, at modest cost to the 
current incomes of poor families. Mexico’s Progresa program has also been found to increase 
schooling, though the gains appear to be lower than for FFE (Behrman et al., 2001; Schultz, 
2001).  This is probably because primary schooling rates are higher in Mexico, implying less 
value-added over the (counter-factual) schooling levels that would obtain otherwise.  Sadoulet 
and de Janvry (2002) show that there would be greater efficiency gains (though higher 
schooling) from Progresa if the program had concentrated on children less likely to attend school 
in the absence of the program, notably by focusing on the transition to secondary school. 
Relying on administrative targeting based on poverty indicators naturally constrains 
performance.  Even the best indicators available are far from perfect predictors of poverty at one 
date, and are typically far worse at predicting changes in welfare  ex ante.  Administrative 
inflexibility further constrains the scope for effective insurance by these means.  Next we will 
consider some ways developing country governments have used to try to improve performance at 
reaching the poor within prevailing informational constraints.  
Community-based programs:  In recent times, community participation in program design 
and implementation has been a popular means of relieving the informational constraint.  The 
central government delegates authority to presumably better-informed community (governmental 
or non-governmental) organizations, while the center retains control over how much goes to each 
locality.  The main concern has been capture by local elites; the informational advantage of 
community-based targeting may well be outweighed by an accountability disadvantage. Good 
evidence on performance is still scant.
25  Reliable generalizations are also likely to be illusive 
given that there are good reasons to expect heterogeneity across communities in the impacts of 
the same program.  Relevant sources of h eterogeneity identified in the theoretical literature 
include local asset inequality (Bhardan and Mookerjee, 2000; Bénabou, 2000) and the extent of 
interlinkage in local social networks (Spagnolo, 1999). 
In the design of Bangladesh’s FFE program, economically backward areas were supposed to 
be chosen by the center leaving community groups—exploiting idiosyncratic local information— 
to select participants within those areas. Galasso and Ravallion (2002) use survey data to assess 
FFE incidence within and between villages.  Targeting performance was measured by the 
difference between the realized per capita allocation to the poor and the non-poor.  The study 
found that targeting performance varied greatly between villages. Higher allocations from the 
center to a village tended to yield better targeting performance, but there was no sign that poorer 
villages were any better or worse at targeting their poor.
26   
                                                 
25   For an excellent survey of the arguments and evidence on community-based targeting see 
Conning and Kevane (1999). 
26   On the theoretical arguments linking targeting performance to poverty see Ravallion (1999a).   14 
The results also suggest that inequality within villages matters to the relative power of the 
poor in local decision-making.  Galasso and Ravallion found that more unequal villages in terms 
of the distribution of land are worse at targeting the poor — consistent with the view that greater 
land inequality comes with lower power for the poor in village decision making.  This suggests a 
mechanism whereby inequality is perpetuated through the local political economy; the more 
unequal the initial distribution of assets, the better positioned the nonpoor will be to capture the 
benefits of external efforts to help the poor.         
  Self-targeting: The informational constraints on redistributive policies in poor countries 
have strengthened arguments for using self-targeting mechanisms.  The classic case is workfare, 
in which work requirements are imposed on welfare r ecipients with the aim of creating 
incentives to encourage participation only by the poor and reduce dependency on the program.
27  
An example is the famous Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) in Maharashtra, India.  
This aims to assure income support in rural areas by providing unskilled manual labor at low 
wages to anyone who wants it.  The scheme is financed domestically, largely from taxes on the 
relatively well-off segments of Maharashtra’s urban populations.  The employment guarantee is 
a novel feature of the EGS, which helps support the insurance function, and also helps empower 
poor people.  In practice, however, most workfare schemes have entailed some rationing of the 
available work, often in combination with geographic targeting.   
Workfare schemes generally have a good record in screening the poor from non-poor, and 
providing effective insurance against both covariate and idiosyncratic shocks.
28  They have 
provided protection when there is a threat of famine (Dréze and Sen, 1989; Ravallion, 1997) or 
in the wake of a macroeconomic crisis (Jalan and Ravallion, 2002b, for Argentina and Pritchett 
et al., 2002, for Indonesia, both in the late 1990s).  Design features are crucial, notably that the 
wage rate is not set too high. For example, Ravallion et al., (1993) provide evidence on how the 
EGS responds to aggregate shocks, and on how its ability to insure the poor was jeopardized by a 
sharp increase in the wage rate. 
There are other ways to use incentives in program design to assure self-targeting of the 
poor.  For example, the rationing of food or health subsidies by queuing can also be self-
targeting (Alderman, 1987), as can subsidizing inferior food staples or packaging in ways that 
are unappealing to the nonpoor. 
  Self-targeted schemes can face a sharp trade-off between targeting performance (meaning 
their ability to concentrate benefits on the poor) and net income gains to participants, given that 
these programs work by deliberately imposing costs on participants.  Self-targeting requires that 
the cost of participation is higher for the non-poor than the poor (so that it is the poor who tend to 
participate), but it may not be inconsequential to the poor.   
A potentially important cost to workfare participants in developing countries is forgone 
income.  This is unlikely to be zero; the poor can rarely afford to be idle.  An estimate for two 
                                                 
27   Besley and Coate (1992) provide a formal model of the incentive arguments. 
28   See, for example, Ravallion and Datt (1995), Subbarao (1997), Teklu et al., (1999), Jalan and 
Ravallion (2000), Chirwa et al., (2002).    15 
villages in Maharashtra, India found that the forgone income from employment on public works 
schemes was quite low — around one quarter of gross wage earnings; most of the time displaced 
was in domestic labor, leisure and unemployment (Datt and Ravallion, 1994). By contrast, for a 
workfare program in Argentina — the Trabajar Program — it was estimated that about one half 
of gross wage earnings was taken up by forgone incomes (Jalan and Ravallion, 2002b).  In the 
Trabajar Program, the income lost to participating workers was probably compensated by 
indirect gains to the poor as residents of the neighborhoods in which the work was done, 
typically involving the creation and m aintenance of valued local infrastructure.  Calculation of 
the cost-effectiveness of this program suggest that it still only costs about $1.00 to $1.50 to 
transfer $1.00 to the poor even taking account of the deadweight loss due to costs of 
participation.
29 However, workfare programs have traditionally under-emphasized the potential 
value to the poor of the assets created, which appear often to mainly benefit the non-poor or be 
of little value to anyone (see, for example, Gaiha, 1996, writing about Maharashtra’s EGS.)   
The Trabajar program illustrates the potential for a new wave of workfare programs that 
emphasize asset creation in poor communities, again compensating for the market failures that 
help create poor areas in the first place.  There is typically much useful work to do in poor 
neighborhoods — work that would probably not get financed otherwise.   
  In macroeconomic or agro-climatic crises, it is to be expected that the emphasis will shift 
to current income gains, away from asset creation  — implying, for example, more labor-
intensive sub-projects on workfare programs (for further discussion see Ravallion, 1999b). 
However, the appropriate trade-off between the objective of raising current incomes of the poor 
versus reducing future poverty will never be a straightforward choice.   
  Sustainability and political economy:  While theory points to efficiency gains from 
permanent redistribution, the implications of short-term redistributions are less clear. The 
insurance gains from targeted transfers also depend on the sustainability of programs across 
different states of nature, including coverage across groups facing different risks.  In these 
respects the record is mixed.  Some programs like the EGS have been sustained over long 
periods, and appear to have provided effective insurance.  This can help assure sustainability, 
since (given that there is idiosyncratic risk) the potential set of beneficiaries is much larger than 
the actual set at any one date. It clearly also helps if the non-poor see benefits from effective 
social protection, such as in attenuating migration to cities in times of stress in rural areas. 
However, other designs for targeted transfer schemes have been more short-lived.  Sustainability 
depends on having broad political support, which can be at odds with fine targeting.  So there 
may well be a trade-off between sustainability and the extent of redistribution by this means. 
Political economy clearly looms large in this area of policy making.  The fact that inequality 
is inefficiently high need not mean that there will be an effective political response to lower it.  
Bénabou (2000) has demonstrated theoretically that an economy with persistently high 
inequality, and little effort to reduce it, can coexist with one that is otherwise identical in 
fundamentals but in which active redistribution keeps inequality low.  External agents, including 
the International Financial Institutions, may well have an important role in using their allocative 
                                                 
29   These are the author’s calculations using the methods outlined in Ravallion (1999b). 
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choices and dialogues on country policy to promote efficient redistributive policies, particularly 
in high inequality countries, where adoption appears less likely.  Similarly, there is a role for the 
central government in promoting efficient redistribution in high-inequality communities. 
V. Conclusions  
Transfers to the poor have often been motivated by inequality or risk aversion.  A trade-off with 
aggregate output is expected.  A body of recent theoretical and empirical work has questioned 
whether there is such a trade-off.  This new research has argued that there can be too much 
uninsured risk and inequality, when judged solely from the viewpoint of aggregate output.  For 
example, credit market failures can mean that it is the poor who are unable to exploit new 
economic opportunities; the more poor people, the fewer the opportunities that get exploited and 
so the lower the rate of growth.  Concentrations of poverty in poor (natural and man-made) 
environments can also be sustained by factor-market failures given geographic externalities.   
This body of theory and evidence offers a new perspective on social protection policies in 
poor countries, suggesting that there is scope for using these policies to compensate for the 
market failures that help perpetuate poverty, particularly in high-inequality settings.  There have 
been a number of seemingly successful transfer schemes that reflect such an emphasis.  
However, in drawing implications for future policy there are a number of caveats.  Not all the 
evidence has been supportive of the theories, or suggestive of large potential gains, even when 
the theory is supported qualitatively by the data.  It is also difficult to pre-judge the best policy 
instruments for achieving efficient redistribution.  For some purposes of anti-poverty policy — 
“helping those who cannot help themselves”  — there is no obvious alternative to targeted 
transfers, barring unacceptable neglect.  But, more generally, it is not clear that targeted transfers 
dominate other options.  These may include direct efforts to make factor markets work better for 
the poor (such as by fostering new institutions for credit provision, or by better enforcement of 
property rights), supply-side interventions in schooling and health-care, or even untargeted 
transfers.  And the way transfers are financed in practice will clearly matter.  In theory there can 
be potential Pareto improvements from transfers financed out of the subsequent income gains to 
poor recipients; but finding a feasible means of such cost recovery is another matter.   
While acknowledging these c aveats, this tour of the new arguments and evidence on 
efficient redistribution and insurance points to a confident rejection of the generally negative 
stereotype of this class of interventions that has been around in mainstream development policy 
discussions for some time. The trade-off against efficiency has probably been exaggerated, and 
the record on performance is better than some (seemingly widely held) perceptions would 
suggest.  It is time for a pragmatic and open-minded approach to this class of interventions, 
recognizing the potentially important role they can play, but using careful design and evaluation 
to assure that the potential is realized.    
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